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Introduction 
Whether a perpetrator commits interpersonal violence domestically or internationally in the 
context of armed conflict and mass victimization, it can induce severe and long-lasting 
psychological trauma in victims, their families and, depending upon the context of 
perpetration, communities and society more widely.2 
Whilst trauma symptoms are undoubtedly problematic for the victims themselves, they can 
also pose challenges for prosecuting authorities in the effective administration of justice. In 
particular, the nature, quality and content of any evidence victims are able to provide is likely 
to be affected by the trauma they have suffered. Testimony may be deeply distressing and 
problematic for these victims. They may comport themselves poorly in or out of court. Their 
memory of elements of their experiences might simply be unavailable or inaccessible to 
them, or their recollections may be jumbled, confused and incoherent.3 
A victim’s psychological symptoms therefore can affect the nature and content of any 
evidence he or she is able to provide in two discrete ways. First, these symptoms can affect 
victims’ ability to provide a clear, accurate, coherent, chronological and complete account of 
the events that they either witnessed or experienced. Second, they can affect the way in which 
victims deliver their evidence. The focus of this article is on the first of these elements.  
In practice, trauma in victim witnesses’ symptoms can affect not only the degree to which 
investigators are able to glean complete, consistent and cohesive accounts of events, but also 
the ability of investigators and judges alike to properly evaluate both the credibility of the 
witness and the reliability of their evidence.   
This article employs the term “trauma” in a broad sense, to refer to an adverse psychological 
response to an overwhelming violent or catastrophic event or events.4 Notably, much of the 
Court’s attention to date in its engagement with issues of trauma has focused on the potential 
impacts of PTSD. The absence of a PTSD diagnosis does not necessarily mean, however, that 
                                                          
1 Dr. Ellie Smith holds a degree in law from Cambridge University, an LLM in International Law from the 
London School of Economics and a PhD in Law, Psychology and Victimology from Bournemouth University. 
She has 15 years of experience in the international human rights, international criminal law and humanitarian 
law fields, gained through legal practice, civil society engagement and academic research.  She has expertise in 
working with those with trauma, including within post-conflict and justice-seeking contexts. Dr. Smith is a 
Principal Associate of GSDM, a consultancy agency with legal specialism in global security and disaster 
management, and she is Researcher at Bournemouth University, on an AHRC-funded project led by Dr. Melanie 
Klinkner to write International Guidelines for the Protection and Investigation of Mass Graves.  
2 Danieli Y, ‘Massive trauma and the healing role of reparative justice’ (2009) 22(5) J of Traumatic Stress 351. 
3 Ellie Smith, “Victims in the Witness Stand: Socio-cultural and Psychological Challenges to the Achievement 
of Testimony” in Kinga Tibori Julia Szabo and Megan Hirst (eds) Victim Participation in International 
Criminal Justice (Springer 2017); Ellie Smith, “Trauma-Impacted Evidence and the Assessment of Witness 
Credibility”, Global Security and Disaster Management, https://gsdm.global/trauma-impacted-evidence-and-the-
assessment-of-witness-credibility/; Herlihy J and Turner S, ‘Should discrepant accounts given by asylum 
seekers be taken as proof of deceit?’ (2006) 16(2) Torture 81.  
4 See Cathy Caruth, Unclaimed Experience: Trauma, Narrative and History (John Hopkins University Press, 
Baltimore 1996) (using a similar definition). I adjust the definition here to the specific context. 
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a victim is symptom free or that they will not experience difficulties in engaging, including 
with the various organs of the Court and its officers.5   
This article employs the term “clinical” in the medical sense, to refer, in the specific context, 
to psychological theory, practice and methods. 
The proper and effective assessment of trauma-impacted evidence is essential to the 
reliability of the International Criminal Court’s (the “ICC” or “the Court”) fact-finding 
function. In order to properly establish the nature of traumatic symptoms that the Court 
is likely to encounter, this article begins with (1) an exploration of the formation and 
complexity of traumatic symptoms for victims of crimes of mass victimization. It goes 
on to consider (2) the prevalence of trauma in victims appearing as witnesses at the ICC, 
before examining (3) the various ways in which different trauma symptoms can affect 
recall and articulation of traumatic events. The article then examines (4) the issue of 
variance in the quality and nature of memory. It concludes with (5) a brief consideration 
of the practice of the Court in dealing with trauma-impacted testimony, including 
potential avenues for enhancing and supporting judicial evaluation of trauma-affected 
evidence in the future.  
1. Crimes of mass victimization before the ICC: formation and complexity of trauma 
The Court, in most cases, operates within the challenging context of mass victimization, 
seeking to pursue an ostensibly retributive mandate whilst simultaneously responding to the 
wide and sometimes disparate needs of societies in transition, where the reparative needs of 
substantial numbers of individual victims may compete with the need for collective repair 
and healing.6   
The same mass victimization context can also complicate the trauma response in victims, and 
this complexity can, in turn, exacerbate difficulties for the Court in the elicitation and 
evaluation of traumatic memory and testimony for victims who appear before it either as 
witnesses or participants. It is therefore useful here to describe, by way of background and 
context, the traumatic layering that is in play for many victims who appear to give evidence 
before the Court. 
Mass victimization can engender a complex and interrelated interplay of individual and 
collective psychological responses in both individual victims and the affected community. At 
an individual level, trauma arising as a result of international crimes can produce “a 
metamorphosis of the psyche … mental decomposition and collapse”,7 leading to the 
deterioration and/or collapse of mental functioning.8  Gross violations can profoundly affect 
the survivor’s sense of self,9 engendering identity disorientation and depersonalization.10 
Man-made trauma such as conflict and gross human rights violations may shatter survivors’ 
                                                          
5 An ICC Trial Chamber in 2016 heard evidence on this point, namely the expert testimony of Dr. Daryn 
Reicherter during the Bemba sentencing hearing. Prosecutor v. Bemba, Transcript, 16 May 2016, ICC-01/05-
01/08-T-368-ENG ET WT 16-05-2016 1/116 SZ T, at 88, line 15 – 89, line 9. 
6 Fattah defines mass victimization as “victimization directed at, or affecting, not only individuals but also 
whole groups. In some cases the groups are very diffuse, the members have nothing or not much in common, 
and the group is not targeted as a specific entity. More often, however, the acts of victimization are directed 
against a specific population”. Ezzat Fattah Understanding Criminal Victimization (Scarborough 1991) 412. 
7 Marcelo N. Vinar, ‘The specificity of torture as trauma: The human wilderness when words fail’ (2005) 86 Intl 
J of Psychoanalysis 313. 
8 Henry Krystal, Integration and Self-Healing: Affect, Trauma, Alexithymia (The Analytic Press 1988). 
9 Ibrahim Kira, ‘Torture Assessment and Treatment: The Wraparound Approach’ (2002) Vol. 8, No.2 
Traumatology 54. 
10 Udo Rauchfleisch, Allgegenwart der Gerwalt, (Vandenhoek and Ruprecht 1996). 
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core beliefs, including their belief that the world is a just place (described as “the existential 
dilemma”),11 their personal inviolability or their belief in others as  trustworthy individuals.12  
Survivors may also experience shame, self-blame and guilt, and a sense of helplessness.  
Survivors can suffer grief both for others and the self, together with anxiety, depression, 
emotional numbness and avoidance. They may also experience intrusive phenomena 
including as flashbacks and nightmares.13 Where victims have been subjected to forms of 
sexual violence, survivors may also experience fear of intimacy, sexual dysfunction and self-
loathing, which may in turn lead to self-injurious behaviour.14  
In addition to the psychological harms experienced at an individual level, affected societies 
may suffer from trauma.15 Trauma at a societal level can manifest itself in varying forms of 
community dysfunction. Torture or ethnic violence typically create “an order based on 
imminent pervasive threat, fear, terror, and inhibition,… a state of generalized insecurity, 
terror, lack of confidence, and rupture of the social fabric”.16 Where communities witness the 
perpetration of abuses such as rape and other forms of violence against their members, they 
may experience severe collective trauma,17 including shock, which can be exacerbated by 
grief for the victim –  where the victim has died, or, in the case of rape, is rejected by her 
family and community.18 
                                                          
11 See e.g., Herlihy and Turner, supra note 3, at 84; Ramsay Gorst-Unsworth and Stuart Turner ‘Psychiatric 
Morbidity in Survivors of Organised State Violence Including Torture’ (1993) 162 British J of Psychiatry 55. 
12 International Rehabilitation Council for Torture Victims, Psychological Evaluation of Torture Allegations: A 
practical guide to the Istanbul Protocol – for Psychologists (2nd ed 2007) 6 – 7 [hereinafter Practical Guide]; 
see also Inger Agger, in The Blue Room: Trauma and Testimony among Refugee Women – A Psycho-Social 
Exploration (Zed Books 1992) 13. 
13 See e.g, Chris Brewin ‘Autobiographical Memory for Trauma: Update on four Controversies’ (2007) 15(3) 
Memory, 227-28; Lisa Duke and others, ‘The sensitivity and specificity of flashbacks and nightmares to trauma’ 
(2008) 22 J of Anxiety Disorders, 310-20. 
14See e.g, Kenneth Plummer, Telling Sexual Stories: Power, Change and Social Worlds, (Routledge, 1995) 70, 
74; Cassandra Clifford, ‘Rape as a Weapon of War and its Long-term Effects on Victims and Society’, 
Conference paper, 7th Global Conference, Violence and the Contexts of Hostility, Budapest, 5-7 May 2008; 
Sophie Yohani and Kristen Hagen, ‘Refugee women survivors of war related sexualised violence: a 
multicultural framework for service provision in resettlement countries’ (2010) Vo. 8, No.3 Intervention, 208-
09; Kristen Hagen, ‘The Nature and Psychosocial Consequences of War Rape for Individuals and Communities’ 
(2010) Vol.2, No. 2 Intl J of Psychological Studies, 19; Pamela Bell, ‘Consequences of Rape for Women’s 
Health and Well-being, Family and Society’, in Marie Vlachova and Lea Biason (eds), Women in an insecure 
world: Violence against women, facts, figures and analysis, (DCAF 2005) 115-21, 117-19. 
15 See Jeffrey Alexander, Trauma: A Social Theory (Polity Press 2012) (exploring the development of social and 
cultural trauma). See also Stevan Weine and others, ‘Testimony psychotherapy in Bosnian refugees: A pilot 
study’ (1998) 155 Am J of Psychiatry, 1721; Kira, supra note 9, at 55.  
16 See Kira, supra note 9, at 54. Although torture is an act perpetrated against individual victims, its effects are 
intended to be experienced on a broader scale, with the effect that, whether implicitly or explicitly, torture 
represents a threat to the victim’s wider community and its value systems. See Practical Guide, supra note 12, 
at 7. 
17 Hagen K, ‘The Nature and Psychosocial Consequences of War Rape for Individuals and Communities’ (2010) 
Vol.2, No. 2 Intl J of Psychological Studies, 19; Joshua Goldstein, War and Gender (Cambridge University 
Press 2001) 362-63; Christoph Schiessl ‘An element of genocide: Rape, total war and international law in the 
twentieth century’ (2002) Vol. 4(2) J of Genocide Research, 198; Bell P, ‘Consequences of Rape for Women’s 
Health and Well-being, Family and Society’, in Marie Vlachova and Lea Biason (eds), Women in an insecure 
world: Violence against women, facts, figures and analysis, (DCAF 2005); Annette Lyth, ‘The development of 
the legal protection against sexual violence in armed conflicts – advantages and disadvantages’ (2001) available 
online at <http://kvinnatillkvinna.se/sites/default/publikationer/rapporter/pdf/development.pdf.  
18 Yohani S and Hagen K, ‘Refugee women survivors of war related sexualised violence: a multicultural 
framework for service provision in resettlement countries’ (2010) Vo. 8, No.3 Intervention; Hagen K, ‘The 
Nature and Psychosocial Consequences of War Rape for Individuals and Communities’ (2010) Vol.2, No. 2 Intl 
J of Psychological Studies, 19.  
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Rather than being experienced discretely, individual and collective/societal aspects of trauma 
are interlinked and interdependent. Victims experience trauma in multiple and concurrent 
capacities: individually, as a direct victim; indirectly, as a family member of a direct victim; 
and as a member of a victimized community or group, indicating a potentially complex array 
of traumatic experiences and symptoms in those participating in proceedings before the ICC. 
Clinical literature identifies a “layering” of trauma in such situations, where an individual 
may experience the first “layer” of trauma with the initiation or increase in repression and 
persecution of, and violence against, the particular group with which they identify. The 
second “layering” of trauma arises when the individual personally becomes a victim of 
serious human rights violations or international crimes.19  
These layers operate interdependently. For example, community affiliation is an aspect of an 
individual’s personal identity.20 Where perpetrators direct persecutory or abusive actions, 
such as genocide or ethnic cleansing, at entire ethnic or cultural populations, the sense of 
allegiance to a group is heightened,21 producing mutual support within the group and 
collective solidarity.22  An attack on the group, or any of its members, disrupts social 
functioning and identity at both individual and collective levels.23 In these circumstances, the 
consequences of an act of ethnic cleansing, such as the destruction of a village or community, 
amounts essentially to the destruction of the personal point of existential reference.24 
Conversely, psychological trauma can affect the individual’s sense of collective attachment 
and connectedness, and this, coupled with a loss of trust in others, may impact upon familial 
and social roles – such as parent, spouse, employee, employer, citizen25 - engendering a 
deterioration in social, educational and occupational functioning.26 This in turn can lead to 
social withdrawal and isolation, affecting societal and cultural aspects of personal identity.27  
Individual and collective trauma responses are seemingly influenced by the specific targeting 
of abuse andthe duration and intensity of the traumatic event(s).28 These factors can, in turn, 
affect the individual’s perceived threat to life, influencing the consequent trauma response. 
An individual is more likely to perceive a violation as representing a threat of imminent death 
when it is individually and directly targeted, compared to longer-term repressive stressors 
                                                          
19 Dislocation and exile, for those forced to flee violence and seek safety across borders marks the third phase of 
the traumatization process. See Guus van der Veer, Counselling and Therapy with Refugees and Victims of 
Trauma: Psychological Problems of Victims of War, Torture and Repression (2nd ed, Wiley and Sons 1998) 5. 
20 See e.g.Yael Danieli, International Handbook of Multigenerational Legacies of Trauma, (New York 1998), at 
Introduction. 
21 See e.g. Aroche J and Coello M J, (2004) ‘Ethnocultural Considerations in Treatment of Refugees’, in Wilson 
J and Drozdek B (eds), Broken Spirits: The Treatment of Traumatized Asylum Seekers, Refugees, War and 
Torture Victims (Brunner-Routledge 2004) 56 [hereinafter Broken Spirits]. 
22 Modvig J and Jaranson J M, ‘A Global Perspective of Torture, Political Violence, and Health’ in Broken 
Spirits, supra note 21, at 37. 
23 Joop De Jong, ‘Public Mental Health and Culture: Disasters as a Challenge to Western Mental Health Care 
Models, the Self, and PTSD’, in in Broken Spirits, supra note 21, at 165, 168.  
24 David Becker, ‘Mental Health and Human Rights: Thinking About the Relatedness of Individual and Social 
Processes’, paper presented at International conference, Towards a Better Future: Building Healthy 
Communities (October 2003) Belfast. 
25 Ron Baker, ‘Psychosocial Consequences for Tortured Refugees Seeking Asylum and Refugee Status in 
Europe’, in Metin Basoglu (ed), Torture and its Consequences: Current Treatment Approaches (Cambridge 
University Press 1992) 86. 
26 Practical guide, supra note 12, at 7. 
27 Kira, supra note 9, at 54. 
28 Jens Modvig and James Jaranson, ‘A Global Perspective of Torture, Political Violence, and Health’, in 
Broken Spirits, supra 21 at 37. 
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directed at a particular community.29 Significantly, while mass conflict is recognized as 
having a potentially widespread, psychological impact upon society, the psychological effects 
are unlikely to be uniform, and instead will depend upon the extent to which specific groups 
and/or individuals were affected.30 
The traumatic response to mass victimization is therefore both layered and complex, 
presenting particular challenges both for victims appearing before the Court to give evidence, 
and the Court itself in the elucidation and weighing of trauma-impacted testimony. 
Before going on to consider the effect of traumatic symptoms on a victim’s ability to produce 
a complete, accurate, coherent and chronological account of events, it is appropriate to briefly 
consider the incidence of trauma in victims appearing before the Court. 
2. The prevalence of trauma in those appearing before the Court 
While some victims appearing before the Court either as participants or witnesses are likely 
to be experiencing trauma symptoms, it is important to acknowledge here that this will not be 
the case for all victims. A Court-funded psychologist, in the case of witnesses appearing for 
the Prosecution, at least, assesses individuals prior to their interviews in order to determine 
whether they are sufficiently mentally robust to withstand the investigative and judicial 
process.31 Once any witness is physically before the Court, the Victims and Witnesses 
Section is mandated to provide support to ensure the psychological safety of witnesses.32   
This does not necessarily mean that the ICC will exclude victims with trauma-impacted 
memory from the judicial process. The assessment and support provided in both cases relate 
to the psychological safety of the victims rather than the quality of evidence that they are able 
to offer, and many individuals who have incomplete or disrupted memories of an event may 
still be sufficiently mentally robust to provide testimony. The prosecution conducts a 
screening process to ensure mental robustness in potential witnesses. It is worth noting that 
the duty under Article 68(1) to protect the psychological wellbeing of victims applies only to 
the Office of the Prosecutor. As a result, the Defense and the Legal Representatives of 
Victims are not required to replicate such screening in their investigative and preparatory 
processes.  
The precise incidence of active trauma symptoms in victims and witnesses who engage with 
the Court is unknown. We know, however, that traumatic symptoms in victims endure for 
many years after the traumatic event(s) experienced,33 and as a result, and in light of the 
above, one should anticipate some level of ongoing trauma in victim-witnesses.  
                                                          
29 ibid. 
30 Aroche and Coello, supra note 21, at 57. 
31 Article 68(1) of the Rome Statute requires the Office of the Prosecutor to take measures to safeguard the 
victims’ psychological well-being during its investigation; see also ICC Office of the Prosecutor, “Policy Paper 
on Sexual and Gender-based Crimes” (2014), at para. 70, https://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/otp/OTP-Policy-
Paper-on-Sexual-and-Gender-Based-Crimes--June-2014.pdf 
32 Rome Statute, Art. 43(6). 
33 A cross-sectional survey of a population-based sample of more than 1,300 survivors of atrocities committed in 
the former Yugoslavia ten years after the conflict, for example, found that a third of those who were sampled 
had suffered from PTSD in the immediate aftermath of conflict. At the time of assessment, 22% of the study 
sample was still experiencing symptoms of PTSD. See Basoglu M and others, ‘Psychiatric and Cognitive 
Effects of War in Former Yugoslavia: Association of Lack of Redress for Trauma and Posttraumatic Stress 
Reactions’ (3 August 2005) Vol. 294, No. 5, J of the Am Medical Assn 580.. A randomized study into the 
mental health status of 400 Rwandan genocide survivors obtained similar results. In the Rwandan study, 
researchers found that more than half of the study sample continued to experience PTSD symptoms ten years 
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In addition, while a significant number of victims and witnesses may have suffered trauma 
symptoms in the immediate aftermath of the event(s), the intervention of natural recovery 
responses in them may mean that they are symptom free by the time that they appear before 
the Court.34 Notably, however, where those individuals suffered a trauma response at the time 
of the event, it may be that they still encounter difficulties in recalling the episode in its 
entirety or with coherence. As a result, the Court should consider the impacts of trauma on 
memory and testimony as a live issue in those instances.   
3. The impact of trauma on memory and victim testimony 
Having examined the formation of trauma within the context of mass victimization, it is 
appropriate to consider how specific symptoms might affect the testimony of victims 
appearing before the Court. 
Trauma can affect the memory of victims or witnesses, and this in turn can impact upon their 
ability to provide a full, accurate, coherent and chronological account of their experiences 
when testifying. This section briefly describes a number of trauma symptoms, by reference to 
the potential impact of those symptoms on the survivors and their ability to provide 
comprehensive testimony. One must acknowledge, however, that while, for the sake of 
convenience, the focus here is on individual symptoms, in practice, many victims will 
experience a number of symptoms cumulatively, and so the separation of symptoms here is 
somewhat artificial. 
In addition to symptoms of psychological trauma, other clinical factors that have the potential 
to affect a victim’s memory may also be present, depending on the form and nature of events 
or abuses suffered. These additional factors are beyond the scope of this article, but may 
include forms of neuro-psychiatric memory impairment as a result of significant head injury, 
starvation or vitamin deficiency (particularly relevant where, for example, conflict has 
disrupted agricultural activity, caused food scarcity or victims are forced to flee their homes). 
A number of traumatic symptoms have the potential to negatively affect a victim’s recall of 
events. Where a victim is suffering from involuntary avoidance, for example, they may 
experience forms of psychogenic amnesia. This in turn will likely entail a disruption of either 
memory or perception, especially in relation to the traumatic event itself,35 with the result that 
some or all of the traumatic episode may simply be inaccessible for the victim for as long as 
he or she continues to experience psychological symptoms of trauma.  
Similar challenges arise for victims who dissociated at the time of the event. Dissociation 
comprises ‘a disruption of and/or discontinuation in the normal integration of consciousness, 
memory, identity, emotion, perception, body representation, motor control, and behaviour’.36  
                                                                                                                                                                                    
after the event, while 60% suffered from major depression. See Brouneus K, ‘The Trauma of Truth Telling: 
Effects of Witnessing in the Rwandan Gacaca Courts on Psychological Health’ (2010) 54(3) J of Conflict 
Resolution, 408. 
34 See Derek Summerfield, ‘The Social Experience of War and Some Issues for the Humanitarian Field’ in  
Patrick J. Bracken & Celia Petty (eds), Rethinking the Trauma of War, (Save the Children/Free Association 
Books 1998) 9, 29 (observing that the preoccupation with therapeutic impact overlooks issues of clinical 
resilience).  
35 See Herlihy and Turner, supra note 3, at 85-87. 
36 American Psychiatric Association, Diagnostic and statistical manual of mental disorders, 5th edn, 
(American Psychiatric Publishing 2013) 291. 
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While dissociation arises as a coping strategy at the time of the event, its effect is to generate 
a level of amnesia in the victim for some or all of the traumatic event in question.37  
Autobiographical memory (alternatively known as declarative or explicit memory) refers to 
our ability to recall the events in our own lives.38 We are able to store, recall and articulate 
autobiographical memories chronologically, coherently and voluntarily.39  
For victims suffering from autobiographical memory impairment, the normal processes and 
pathways for the storage of memory essentially fail at the time of the event concerned. As a 
result, a victim’s memory may be fragmentary or non-existent.40 In these cases, experts 
believe that while typical pathways for the storage of memories fail, the body’s implicit 
memory (‘implicit memory’ relates to our emotional responses, habits or reflexive actions)41 
continues to operate, and so the body retains some form of memory of the traumatic event, 
albeit one that it difficult for the victim to access. Retrieval of such memories in such 
circumstances can be complex, and may require expert support. Most notably, these “hidden 
memories” can arise unpredictably, in response to triggers or reminders of the event. While 
triggers or stimuli might include smells, sensation or emotional states that are resonant of the 
event, memories can also arise when someone puts questions to a victim about it. Because of 
this, different aspects of a victim’s experiences may arise depending on the questions posed. 
Significantly, rather than experiencing the event as something that happened in the past, the 
unprocessed memory will arise for the victim as if occurring in the present, and so recall is 
likely to be highly distressing for the victim.  
 
There is a growing consensus in clinical literature that traumatic memories are of a different 
character.42 During deeply traumatic events, it is believed that greatly heightened emotional 
arousal interferes with the processing and storage of information in explicit memory, and the 
process essentially fails. As a result, autobiographical memory of the event is fragmentary or 
non-existent.43 
Such memories are accessed through qualitatively different ‘pathways’, and rather than 
arising voluntarily or consciously in the victim, respond to triggers or reminders of the event. 
Significantly, from the point of view of the legal practitioner, these triggers can include being 
questioned or cross-examined about the event. Because these memories are subject to 
triggers, different aspects may arise, depending upon the questions posed. As a result, 
Prosecution and Defence counsel as well as victims’ lawyers will require a particularly 
considered and specific strategy to their questioning. In addition, where victims are able to 
retrieve memories, these are often not chronological and are fragmented. As a result, 
testimony may be both incomplete and potentially lacking in coherence. 
                                                          
37 See Weiss, D.S., et al,, ‘Predicting symptomatic distress in emergency services personnel’, J of Consulting 
and Clinical Psychology 63, 361-68. 
38 Herlihy and Turner, supra note 3, at 86. 
39 Ibid.  
40 Ibid, observing that ‘when someone is interviewed and asked about an experience that was traumatic, and has 
only, or largely, memories of this fragmented type, they are unlikely to be able to produce a coherent verbal 
narrative, quite simply because no complete verbal narrative exists’.  
41 Ibid. 
42 Brewin, C, Posttraumatic stress disorder: Malady or myth? Yale University Press (2003), London. 
43 Herlihy and Turner, for example, observe that ‘when someone is interviewed and asked about an experience 
that was traumatic, and has only, or largely, memories of this fragmented type, they are unlikely to be able to 
produce a coherent verbal narrative, quite simply because no complete verbal narrative exists.’ Herlihy and 
Turner 2006, supra note 3, p. 86 
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Where a victim has experienced rape and/or other forms of sexual violence, traumatic 
sequelae and hence memory retrieval can be additionally problematic for them. Avoidance 
and dissociation symptoms, for example, are significantly more pronounced in victims of 
sexual violence than in victims of non-sexual trauma.44 Victims of sexual violence also 
experience a higher PTSD symptom count when compared to victims of non-sexual trauma.45  
While a number of traumatic symptoms can negatively affect a victims’ memory, other 
symptoms, whilst deeply problematic for the victims, may operate to enhance their 
recollection. Victims who suffer from regular flashbacks of an event, for example, or who 
have repeated nightmares such that they regularly relive their experiences, are likely to have a 
better-than-normal memory of the events concerned. Intrusive phenomena, such as 
flashbacks, however, may arise during testimony, and this in turn will affect victims’ ability 
to concentrate and to provide a coherent account.46 
The symptoms identified above will pose challenges for the Court in terms of how it elicits 
and evaluates testimony. This challenge is exacerbated to some extent by variations in 
memory patterns between witnesses of the same event, with the result that traumatic 
responses can give rise to disparate testimonies. 
4. Variations in the quality and nature of memory 
Victims of the same or similar events do not necessarily suffer from the same or similar 
traumatic symptoms.  
In addition to the nature, degree and duration of a traumatic episode, the victim’s personality 
and the extent to which he or she has been able to process the experience will influence the 
traumatic response. Where, for example, an individual is hypersensitive, he or she would 
likely be traumatized more readily and would experience an event as more traumatizing when 
compared to someone who does not easily respond to stimulation.47 The degree of resilience 
a person possesses (i.e. the extent to which a person is able to recover unaided from a 
distressing event) also influences the persistence of his or her symptoms. One also would 
anticipate differences in memory and focus between victims with a “fight” response at the 
time of the event when compared with those experiencing a “flight” response. The mental 
focus – and hence memory content – in the former would likely relate to the source of the 
trauma itself, including the attacker, or any weapons used. In the case of the latter, any 
                                                          
44 See Van Velsen, C., Gorst-Unsworth, C., and Turner, S., Survivors of torture and organized violence: 
demography and diagnosis, J of Traumatic Stress (1996) 9, 181–93, 188. 
45 Ramsay, R., Gorst-Unsworth, C., and Turner, S., ‘Psychiatric morbidity in survivors of organised state violent 
including torture. A retrospective series’, The British J of Psychiatry (1993) 5-58; see also Lecic-Tosevski, D., 
and Bakalic, J., ‘Against Torture – The Road to a Healthy Individual and Society’, in Spiric, Z., Knezevic, G. 
And Jovic, V., et al (eds), Torture in War: Consequences And Rehabilitation of Victims – Yugoslav Experience 
(Intl Aid Network 2004) 97. 
46 Bogner, D, et al. (2007) ‘Impact of sexual violence on disclosure during Home Office interviews’, 
British Journal of Psychiatry (2007) 191:75–81. 
47 See Prosecutor v. Ntaganda, Transcript, 18 April 2016, ICC-01/04-02/06-T-84-ENG, at 15, lines 5-24; 17, 
lines 5-25 (transcribing the testimony of prosecution expert Dr. John Charles Yuille as to hypersensitivity and  
“predisposing and precipitating” factors); see also, Wairagala Wakabi, ‘Expert Explains Variance in Memory 
Among Trauma Victims’, Intl Justice Monitor, 18 April 2016, < https://www.ijmonitor.org/2016/04/expert-
explains-variance-in-memory-among-trauma-victims/> accessed 15 September 2019; Wairagala Wakabi, 
‘Expert Concludes Testimony on Trauma’, Intl Justice Monitor, 22 April 2016, 
<https://www.ijmonitor.org/2016/04/expert-concludes-testimony-on-trauma/> accessed 15 September 2019. 
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memory would likely focus on possible escape routes, including, for example, the layout of a 
room or the position of windows or the presence of others.48 
The degree to which prevailing collective trauma symptoms had already affected the 
individual also will influence traumatic impacts, and hence memory patterns.  
The range of traumatic symptoms experienced by victims can therefore vary considerably. As 
indicated here, different symptoms of trauma can affect memory in different ways, and as a 
result, victims can display different corresponding memory patterns, even where they are 
victims of the same event. 
How, then, should the Court go about evaluating victim testimony in these circumstances? 
5. Traumatic memory in evidence before the ICC 
Because the quality, form and content of memory in victims can vary significantly, this can 
pose specific challenges for the Court in its assessment of the evidentiary weight of victim 
testimony. Some victims who are suffering trauma, for example, will be able to provide a 
detailed and chronological account of what they experienced or saw, while others will have 
little or no recollection of aspects of an event or the event in its entirety. A gap or 
incoherence in testimony does not necessarily indicate that a particular witness is lying, but 
equally does not automatically indicate veracity.  
Significantly, the Court is aware that trauma can affect victims’ memories of events, and 
hence, potentially, their ability to produce a complete, chronological and coherent account of 
the events experienced or witnessed by them, and seeks to recognize this difficulty in the 
course of its assessment of victim testimony. In the Lubanga case, for example, Trial 
Chamber I noted, in relation to the evidence of a former child soldier, that “witnesses who 
were children at the time of the events, or who suffered trauma, may have had particular 
difficulty in providing a coherent, complete and logical account”.49 ICC Trial Chambers have 
made similar observations in Katanga50 and Bemba judgements.51  
It is clearly a positive thing that the Court is aware that victims’ memories may have been 
affected by trauma, and that as a result, inconsistencies or gaps in their testimony do not 
automatically equate to a lack of credibility. Significantly, however, the provision by the 
Court of some degree of “leeway” for potentially traumatized victims has proceeded in the 
absence of any formal clinical diagnosis of traumatic symptoms in those victims – either 
current or historic –  that might account for difficulties or incoherencies evident in their 
accounts. Instead, there has seemingly been an assumption by the Court of some non-specific, 
background degree of trauma that could accommodate some level of inaccuracy in a victim’s 
account. 
                                                          
48 ibid., at 18, line 14 – 19, line 2. 
49 Prosecutor v. Lubanga, Judgment, 14 March 2012, ICC-01/04-01/06-2842, at para 103.  
50 Prosecutor v. Katanga, Judgment, 7 March 2014, ICC-01/04-01/07-3436, at para 83 (noting that the Trial 
Chamber had “made allowance for instances of imprecision, implausibility or inconsistency, bearing in mind the 
overall context of the case and the specific circumstances of individual witnesses … some of whom were still 
children at the time, or were traumatised”). 
51 Prosecutor v. Bemba, Judgment, 21 March 2016, ICC-01/05-01/08-3343, at para 230 (noting it relation to its 
evaluation of witness testimony that it “considered the entirety of their testimony, having regard, in particular, to 
the capacity and quality of their recollection. In this respect, the Chamber took into account… the fact that the 
charges relate to events that occurred in 2002 and 2003, and that witnesses who suffered trauma may have had 
particular difficulty in providing a coherent, complete, and logical account.)” 
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Such an assumption is problematic, in part because it proceeds in the absence of clinical 
evidence, but also because it fails to recognize the great variation in memory that is likely to 
exist between victims who are suffering or have suffered a traumatic response. As this article 
hopefully illustrates, the nature of traumatic memory can vary enormously and victims would 
likely display differing memory patterns depending upon the traumatic symptoms they 
suffered. It is fair for the Court to assume that victims who have suffered a traumatic 
response may have difficulties in recalling an event coherently, completely and with clarity. 
An assumption, however, that all victims will experience the same level or degree of 
difficulty in their recall, however, is unsustainable in practice.   
In fact, for the Court to effectively assess both the accuracy and veracity of trauma-impacted 
testimony, it is essential that it first has a clear appreciation of the quality of the victim’s 
memory, and in particular, whether the memory pattern displayed by the witness is consistent 
with the trauma symptoms that he or she has experienced and, in some cases, continue to 
experience. 
This process, in turn, will inevitably require significant engagement by the Court with 
psychological expertise in the evaluation and diagnosis of traumatic symptoms, both past and 
present and, potentially, the expert production of anticipated memory patterns that such 
symptoms might precipitate. 
The context for further expert psychological engagement is a promising one. The Court is 
already broadly alert to the psychological impacts of trauma on victims. It already has sought 
to accommodate victims’ needs within its processes and demonstrated a willingness to 
engage with psychological expertise at various junctures in exercising its judicial functions. 
As already noted, Article 68(1) of the Rome Statute requires that the Court take “appropriate 
measures to protect the safety, physical and psychological well-being, dignity and privacy of 
victims and witnesses”, requiring in particular that the Prosecutor “shall take such measures 
particularly during the investigation and prosecution of such crimes”. The Court is sensitive 
to the emotional difficulties that witnesses might experience in speaking about their 
experiences, and has engaged with psychological experts to inform its actions aimed at 
enabling vulnerable witnesses to provide testimony. In the Lubanga case, for example, the 
Court heard expert evidence on how best it could support and enable the evidence of former 
child soldiers suffering from trauma.52 It heard and received expert psychological evidence of 
victimhood in individual cases,53 as well as in relation to the form, degree and impact of 
trauma - for the purpose of determining an appropriate sentence,54 and in assessing 
reparations.55 
                                                          
52 See Prosecutor v. Lubanga, Instructions to the Court’s expert on child soldiers and trauma, ICC-01/04-01/06-
1671, 9 February 2009. 
53 See e.g. Prosecutor v. Ntaganda, Prosecution’s list of expert witnesses and request pursuant to regulation 35 
to vary the time limit for disclosure of the report of one expert witness, ICC-01/04-02/06-560, at 6, 16 April 
2015 (instructing, inter alia, Maeve Lewis, a psychotherapist with expertise in working with survivors of sexual 
violence, with respect to psychological effects of trauma on four prosecution witnesses).  
54 In the Bemba case, for example, the Trial Chamber decided it would hear the evidence of Dr Daryn Reicherter 
on the “‘longitudinal and intergenerational impact of crimes’, including aspects which had not previously 
featured in the evidentiary record, for example, the effects of trauma on parenting, intergenerational 
transmission of trauma, and healing prospects.” Prosecutor v. Bemba, Decision on requests to present additional 
evidence and submissions on sentence and scheduling the sentencing hearing, ICC-01/05-01/08-3384, at para. 
12, 4 May 2016. 
55 See Prosecutor v. Lubanga, Judgment on the appeals against the “Decision establishing the principles and 
procedures to be applied to reparations” of 7 August 2012, ICC-01/04-01/06-2904, 3rd March 2015, paras 189 
and 191; Prosecutor v. Lubanga, Amended Order for Reparations, 3rd March 2015, ICC-01/04-01/06-3129-
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Engagement by the Court with psychological expertise as a means of enabling its assessment 
of oral evidence, including in terms of accuracy and veracity, is not without its challenges. 
An accused person has a right to be tried without undue delay.56 As a result, recourse to 
psychological expertise would need to be used relatively sparingly, and the Court should 
employ psychological expertise early on in order to avoid undue delays. In addition, the ICC 
Judges are and must remain the sole arbiters of fact in any case before them, including in 
assessing the weight of evidence and the credibility of those testifying before it. The Court 
must exercise particular care to ensure that recourse to psychological expertise as a tool for 
assessing victims’ evidence does not usurp its evidence-assessing function.  
Conclusion 
Crimes of mass vicitmization, such as those falling within the remit of the ICC, can engender 
traumatic consequences for victims which they may experience at the individual, familial, 
communal and societal levels. The incidence of trauma can affect the ability of victims to 
construct a complete, accurate, chronological and coherent account of their experiences, and 
this, in turn, presents specific challenges for the Court in its elicitation of victim testimony 
and assessment of witness credibility. In order to properly assess the credibility, reliability, 
veracity and weight of testimonial evidence, the Court needs an understanding of the quality 
and nature of the victim’s memory, including in particular the extent to which the victim’s 
memory pattern is consistent with the traumatic symptoms that he or she experienced and 
may continue to experience.  
While effective assessment of evidence will necessarily involve recourse to psychological 
expertise, it is essential that the Court remains the arbiter of fact in any given instance. The 
Court, therefore must strike a careful balance to ensure that expert clinical evidence operates 
to support, inform and enhance the Court’s ability to carry out this function, rather than usurp 
it.  
The Court itself is broadly alert to the fact that trauma can affect a victims’ engagement with 
its judicial processes in various ways, and it engages with expert psychological practitioners 
in order to counter those challenges. The context for further engagement is therefore likely a 
promising one. Such engagement is also essential if the Court is to effectively assess trauma-
impacted testimony.  
                                                                                                                                                                                    
AnxA, para 58; Prosecutor v. Lubanga, Filing on Reparations and Draft Implementation Plan, ICC-01/04-
01/06-3177-Red, 3rd November 2015, paras 32, 268 – 270, 273 – 278. 
56 Rome Statute, Art. 67(1)(c). 
